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The end (for human scientists) is nigh? The posit of this discourse is that the majority, if not all,
scientific research will eventually be undertaken by one, or a number of, weak artificial intelligences.
INTRODUCTION
“Hope we’re not just the biological boot loader for digital superintelligence. Unfortunately, that is
increasingly probable” Elon Musk, twitter (August 3, 2014) [1]
The last three centuries have borne witness to spectacular progress in mathematics and the natural sciences, with
developments such as calculus, classical mechanics, thermodynamics, quantum theory and general relativity, to name
but a few. That said, in a classic paper by Eugene Wigner titled the ‘Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the
Natural Sciences’ [2] he observed that it is “. . . not at all natural that laws of nature exist, much less that man is able to
discover them”. Towards the end of his paper he proposed the ‘empirical law of epistemology’ to account for our ability
to understand, to such a surprising degree, the world around us. However, in the very long run it is perhaps inevitable
that scientists will eventually become incapable of thinking openly enough to have ideas that have the potential to
significantly advance science. In physics, for example, certain serious impasses seem to have been reached. Two of
the most well known problems are; the long standing difficulty in melding together the somewhat disparate theories
of general relativity and quantum mechanics; the last six decades have still not produced a satisfactory theory for
quantum gravity, with competing theories like string theory or loop quantum gravity struggling to get the job done.
Another problem that is causing headaches is the nature of so-called ‘dark matter’, non-Baryonic matter that is
estimated to constitute a staggering 84% of the mass of the universe [3]. Theories to explain the observations of an
almost solid-body like motion of galaxies originated with Fritz Zwicky applying the virial theorem in the 1930’s [4, 5].
Over eighty years later there is, as yet, no good theory to explain what is going on, with hypotheses like ‘weakly
interacting massive particles’ (WIMPS), ‘modified Newtonian dynamics (MOND), and extensions to the Standard
Model seemingly ruled out. There are now proposals for a ‘hidden sector’, composed of more complex self-interacting
dark matter [6], an obscured section of the universe that we can only detect by way of gravity.
The Church-Turing-Deutsch principle states that: ‘every finitely realizable physical system can be perfectly simu-
lated by a universal model computing machine operating by finite means’ [7]. Michael Nielsen has pointed out that
“No one has yet managed to deduce this form of Deutsch’s principle from the laws of physics. Part of the reason is
that we don’t yet know what the laws of physics are!” [8]. If this is indeed the case, and we understand less about
physics than we think we do, then scientists may sooner-or-later end up instead dedicating their time to going down
rabbit-holes; for example perhaps by unintentionally extrapolating beyond the validity of their models, or producing
work that, although correct, is essentially irrelevant. Adopting the words of Nobel laureate David Gross, the issue
“. . . is not one of ideology but strategy: What is the most useful way of doing science?” [9].
In Part I of this manuscript I shall focus on the practical aspects of the ongoing project of a complete knowledge
of science: philosophy, our perceptive abilities, human error and biases, working practices, and aesthetics. In Part II
I shall mention five examples of the progress that the (relatively) nascent field of artificial intelligence (AI) is making
in science.
PART I
Philosophy of scientists
It was the illustrious Auguste Comte, founder of positivism and regarded as one of the first modern philosophers of
science that, in 1835, famously stated: “On the subject of stars, all investigations which are not ultimately reducible
to simple visual observations are . . . necessarily denied to us. While we can conceive of the possibility of determining
their shapes, their sizes, and their motions, we shall never be able by any means to study their chemical composition
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2FIG. 1. Fraunhofer’s adsorption lines in the solar spectrum, taken from his work published in 1817 [11].
or their mineralogical structure . . . Our knowledge concerning their gaseous envelopes is necessarily limited to their
existence, size . . . and refractive power, we shall not at all be able to determine their chemical composition or even
their density. . . I regard any notion concerning the true mean temperature of the various stars as forever denied to
us.” [10]. This statement was evidently made without being aware of the future impact of the experimental work
of Joseph von Fraunhofer, published in 1817 [11] providing the basis for the eventual science of spectroscopy - the
study of light spectra. In conjunction with the work of Gustav Kirchhoff on atomic absorption lines [12, 13], by the
late 1800’s it was indeed possible to have a very good idea of the chemical composition of stars. With the work of
Josef Stefan it was also possible to obtain a value for the temperature of stars. The point is that one of the greatest
intellects ever, by way of a reasoned argument, arrived at a conclusion that nature was able to throw back at us for
being unfounded.
Incidents like this have unfortunately lead to there being some notable modern-day detractors of the value of
philosophy in science; in a recent Google Zeitgeist conference, Stephen Hawking went as far as to say that ‘philosophy
is dead’ [14]. The physicist Lawrence Krauss said “. . . the worst part of philosophy is the philosophy of science; the
only people, as far as I can tell, that read work by philosophers of science are other philosophers of science. It has no
impact on physics what so ever” [15]. Criticisms of the philosophy of science aside, we are interested in epistemology
and the acquisition of knowledge. All scientists, be it consciously or unconsciously, have their own philosophy of
science, which influences their approach to the work that they do. That said, it is often the case that working
scientists do not have a clear premeditated ‘philosophy’ which guides them in their professional endeavours. It has
been suggested that most scientists are ‘critical realists’, a subset of scientific realism [16]. Scientific realism is the
viewpoint that there exists a world independently of ourselves (our minds), and that science does a progressively
good job of describing both the ‘observable’ and the ‘unobservable’ parts of it. That science as a whole represents
an ever improving approximate truth. An observable would be something one could directly experience, whereas an
unobservable would be something for which there is indirect evidence, such as electrons, quarks etc. Within scientific
realism there are three main variants: explanationist realism; entity realism; and structural realism. Explanationist
realism believes in unobservables if they form part of a theory. entity realism asks for a stronger justification of
unobservables before assigning them to be part of reality, such as being able to causally manipulate them, and
structural realism, which believes in the structure, but does not assign reality to unobservables. As well as the
realists, there are are the anti-realists, with a dual viewpoint which can be divided up into empiricists, constructivists,
operationalists or instrumentalists. In a survey in the magazine Physics World, undertaken by Robert P. Crease [17]
it became evident that many scientists do not have a clear-cut philosophical approach to their work, and indeed a
number of them simultaneously maintained traditionally diametric philosophies [18].
In Immanuel Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’ (1787) he states: “All our knowledge begins with sense, proceeds thence
to understanding, and ends with reason, beyond which nothing higher can be discovered in the human mind. . . ”1. The
novelist F. Scott Fitzgerald famously wrote “the test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas
1 Meiklejohn translation.
3FIG. 2. A wild daffodil as seen with an ultraviolet filter (Photo courtesy of Bjørn Rørslett).
in the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to function” [19]. An AI could hold an arbitrary number of
opposed ideas in its memory at the same time, and test them one by one. If an AI can be programmed to reason
better than ourselves, I see no reason why an AI could not make a better scientist. It is interesting to speculate
whether an AI will be a na¨ıve realist, having access to a Kantian ‘noumenal’ world, and the privilege of a vision of
an objective reality, seeing the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
Reality is an illusion: Interface theory of perception
“ . . . humans could infer only as much as their senses allowed, but not experience the actual object
itself”. Immanuel Kant [20]
Let us take for example the humble bee; bees, and many other birds and insects, can see ultraviolet light, and many
flowers have a totally different aspect when seen in the ultraviolet (see Fig. 2). If bees saw as we do, they would almost
certainly not survive very long, having great difficulty in locating their food source. Work by Donald Hoffman and
co-workers on the Interface Theory of Perception [21] indicates that we are essentially incapable of correctly viewing
reality. They find that “veridical perceptions can be driven to extinction by non-veridical strategies that are tuned to
utility rather than objective reality” [22]. They postulate that evolution selects us on the basis of fitness for seeing the
world from the point of view of survival, rather than rewarding ‘veridical perceptions’. In other words, our world-view
is an internalised description, arrived at due to our animal nature. An analogy used is that of the graphical user
interface on our computers; we see and interact with icons for files, CDs, printers, programs etc. We do not see the
true nature of the files. If we could see the ‘true’ nature of the file, say the spiral of tiny distinctly orientated magnetic
domains imprinted on a hard disk, we would be at a complete loss to get anything done. The reality of the string of
1’s and 0’s is hidden from us, and that is for the better; to be able to decipher the raw data would require a lot of
time and energy, valuable resources when it comes to survival. Hoffman creates ‘fitness functions — mathematical
functions that describe how well a given strategy achieves the goals of survival and reproduction’. These functions
are then input into Monte Carlo simulations that run evolutionary ‘games’. The results seem to indicate that in the
end we only see a ‘symbolic’ version of reality, because that is faster and cheaper and thus favors survival.
Human error: logarithms: exponentially difficult?
The difficulty associated with scientists doing science could be seen as being somewhat analogous to that of John
Napier (as well as others to come). His tables of logarithms ‘Mirifici Logarithmorum Canonis Descriptio’ (1614) and
‘Logarithmorum Chilias Prima’ (1617) with Henry Briggs, were calculated by hand over a period of years. These tables
were inevitably error-prone (for example see this analysis [23]), they had to be; the human mind is not conditioned
to calculate error free to that extent. Such errors were not only limited to the calculations, but also introduced in the
transcription and printing process.
A little over two-hundred years later Charles Babbage saw this weakness and invented his difference engine, a
mechanical entity whose ‘world view’ is purely numerical. In 1822 he presented a short paper to the Astronomical
Society of London ‘On the application of machinery to the computation of astronomical and mathematical tables’, and
in 1831 he produced the book ‘Table of the Logarithms of the Natural Numbers from 1 to 108000’ [24]. Unfortunately
4FIG. 3. A portion of Babbage’s Difference Engine No. 1 (c. 1832) which currently stands in the Science Museum in London.
(Source: Science Museum Group Collection Online).
only small sections of his Difference Engines were actually constructed, and his later analytical engine was never built,
much to the chagrin of his sponsors, the British government.
Today, to attempt to calculate logarithms by hand would be considered a fool’s errand. It is entirely possible that
the current situation in the natural sciences is analogous; doing science ‘by-hand’ is inefficient and error-prone. What
is needed this time is some sort of intelligence engine.
Experimenter bias
Psychologists have long been aware that we play host to a large array of cognitive biases [25], a number of issues
have long been known, in particular a group of phenomena known as ‘experimenter bias’ –although it almost goes
without saying that theoreticians can also partake. Due to this it can be sometimes exceedingly difficult to set-up
a well designed experiment. In 1979 David Sackett compiled a ‘catalogue of biases which may distort the design,
execution, analysis and interpretation of research’. He identified no less than 35 factors that affect results [26]. A few
examples of biases particularly relevant to scientific investigation are mentioned in an article by Regina Nuzzo [27]:
• Hypothesis myopia - where one finds what one is looking for, and ignores other hypothesis.
• The Texas sharpshooter - misinterpreting random patterns as being meaningful (the origin of the term is the
story of a young boy who never misses; he simply shoots at the side of a barn, then a posteriori draws a target
around the hole)
• Asymmetric attention - paying more attention to unusual results than to ‘expected’ results
• Just-so storytelling - a posteriori rationalisation of results
• Stopping data collection before time due to a false positive in A/B tests.
Various research protocols can put in place in order to avoid these problems by using mechanisms such as:
• Devils Advocacy - actively test alternative hypothesis
• Pre-commitment - publish intentions before performing data collection
5• Teams of rivals - collaborate with groups that hold strongly different opinions
• Blind data analysis - undertake analysis on an ‘unknown’ data set, without knowing the results (see also [28])
• Having, and sticking to, stopping rules for A/B tests
Publish or perish
A less philosophical but more practical problem is summed up in the phrase ‘publish or perish’, which has been
around since 1927 [29] and refers to in implicit pressure to publish academic studies in order to obtain tenure, funding,
etc. Indeed, year on year there has been a significant rise in scientific production. The open access PubMed database
currently indexes over 25 million journal articles in the fields of biomedical and the life sciences. Their annual
statistical reports [30] indicate that in recent years this figure grows by almost a million per annum, corresponding to
the addition of over one hundred papers an hour. It is inevitable that not all of this is necessarily quality work. It is
also impossible, even for a whole team of researchers, to be constantly aware of all the research publication relevant
to their work 2. Correspondingly there is an ever increasing rate of retractions in the published scientific literature
[31]. The situation is not just the fault of individual scientists. Recent work [32] has studied the enduring prevalence
of false positives in scientific publications from the viewpoint of natural selection. To do this a dynamical population
model was created whose protagonists had the ‘utmost integrity’, and never cheated 3. Their model consisted of three
assumptions:
• Each laboratory of researchers were capable of positively identifying a true association
• Unless otherwise, the better this capability, the greater the rate of false positives
• If effort were to be expended in identifying false positives then productivity would decrease
One can then imagine how, in an environment where productivity means prizes, the eventual result is the indirect
encouragement of ‘poor methodological practices’. In some fields, such as biomedical research, the situation has
become so bad that it has been suggested that a good many of studies, for various reasons, are incorrect [33]. In a
recent statistical analysis of publications in the field of anesthesia [34] it was found that in a set of 5087 clinical trials
published between 2000 and 2015, serious problems were identified in 4.1% of these papers, indicative of corrupted,
incorrect, or just plain falsified data. These practical problems, (usually) unintentionally introduced by the scientists
themselves, could be viewed as being, in some way, similar to the ‘transcription and printing’ problems encountered
with the tables of logarithms mentioned earlier.
Mathematics and computer-assisted proofs: anti-aesthetic?
“A good mathematical proof is like a poem – this is a telephone directory!”
In this section we shall mention two mathematical problems that are easy to formulate, but after many years had
passed, were eventually proven in good part with the aid of computers (Note: this is an anathema to many mathe-
maticians). The above quip was made with regards to the proof of the four-color map problem, first posed in 1852
‘four colours suffice to colour any planar map so that no two adjacent countries are the same colour’ [35, 36]. This
was one of the first ever problems resolved with the help of a computer. The solution was eventually obtained in
1977, but only after using over 1,200 hours on an IBM 360 [37, 38], the resulting publication was over one-hundred
pages long, and was accompanied by 465 pages of microfiche [39, 40]. Appel and Haken, in their popular article in
Scientific American [41] interestingly observed that “In a sense the program was demonstrating superiority not only
in the mechanical parts of the task but in the intellectual areas as well”.
Another high profile problem whose proof required the assistance of computers was the Kepler conjecture, which
was first set down by Kepler himself in 1611 [42] in his treatise ‘Strena seu de nive sexangula’ (On the Six-Cornered
Snowflake). The Kepler conjecture states that ‘no packing of congruent balls in Euclidean three-space has density
2 Indeed there is now an AI powered search engine, Semantic Scholar, designed to address this situation.
3 The protagonists in the study; simulated scientists, were all treated ethically.
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FIG. 4. (a) A map using four colours. (b) One of the diagrams in Kepler’s ‘Strena seu de nive sexangula’ (Courtesy of The
Rare Book & Manuscript Library of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign).
greater than that of the face-centered cubic packing’. The proof (by exhaustion) was finally published in 2006, in six
sections, occupying a special issue of the journal, and spans over two hundred and sixty pages [43] This proof was
only formally verified in 2014 [44, 45] by what is known as the Flyspeck Project, which made use of the HOL (Higher
Order Logic) Light proof assistant. However, if there ever was an example on a ‘non-surveyable proof’ it would be the
solution of the Boolean Pythagorean triples problem; which takes up a 200 terabyte file [46]. A wonderful collection
of other examples of computer-assisted mathematics can be found in Ref. [47].
In his 1940 essay ‘A Mathematician’s Apology’ G. H. Hardy extols:
The mathematician’s patterns, like the painter’s or the poet’s must be beautiful; the ideas like the colours
or the words, must fit together in a harmonious way. Beauty is the first test: there is no permanent place
in the world for ugly mathematics.
This requirement for a proof to be “. . . elegant, concise and completely comprehensible by a human mathematical
mind” [41], or to be like a poem, a sentiment prevalent amongst mathematicians, has certainly paid off in the past,
but is not a fundamental requirement, and under some circumstances, could conceivably hinder progress.
Our days are numbered
Our days are numbered, quite literally, in the form of probabilities. Studies have been undertaken to asses the
chances that various sectors are susceptible to being ‘computerisable’ in the future. In a study in 2013 [48] ranking
the probability of being computerisable, chemists and physicists, both involved in ‘creative intelligence tasks’ came
in at ranks #173 and #175 respectively, with a 10% chance of being ‘computerisable’ at some point in time, even-
tually becoming redundant. Mathematicians fare a bit better, with a ranking of #135, and a 4.7% chance of being
computerisable. All other physical scientists come in at #281, with a 43% chance.
Indeed, in a 2016 survey, taken amongst 352 of the attendees of two of the most important AI conferences, the
consensus was reached that “there is a 50% chance of AI outperforming humans in all tasks in 45 years and of
automating all human jobs in 120 years” [49].
7FIG. 5. Arthur Samuel and his checkers playing IBM 701 (Photo courtesy of IBM).
PART II
Artificial Intelligence (AI)
“Shut up and calculate!” N. David Mermin [50]
The above quotation, although taken out of its original context, could well be the apothegm of narrow, or weak,
AI. The philosopher John R. Searle, in his paper ‘Minds, brains, and programs’, subdivided artificial intelligence
into ‘strong’ (general-purpose) and ‘weak’ [51]. He describes that in the case of a strong AI . . . “the appropriately
programmed computer really is a mind, in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to
understand and have other cognitive states.”. On the other hand, a weak AI is a program that has a specific, reduced
remit. For example, a weak AI may be designed for image recognition; it could effectively and efficiently classify
images into categories such as ‘car’, ‘flower’, ‘cat’ etc. A strong AI could do the same thing, but at the same time be
thinking ‘I wonder how much that car costs?’, ‘that is a nice flower!’, ‘I am more of a dog than a cat person’ . . . .
In AI research there is currently no Master Algorithm [52], but rather there are five weak ‘camps’:
• Symbolists, using logic
• Evolutionaries with genetic programs [53]
• Bayesians, with graphical models [54]
• Analogisers, with support vectors
• Connectionists, with neural networks
as yet these threads have not synthesised into one universal approach, which could potentially be ‘strong’.
weak-AI and machine learning
Machine learning, sometimes known as statistical learning, is a sub-field of AI. The term ‘machine learning’ was
coined by Arthur Samuel in 1959 in his paper describing a computer program designed to play the game of checkers
[55]. In his seminal work he combined rote-learning with the groundbreaking ‘learning-by-generalisation’, leading to
a program that could play a reasonable game after only 8-10 hours of running (on an IBM 701). He defined machine
learning as when “. . . computers [have] the ability to learn without being explicitly programmed”. Computers playing
games against humans has long been a testing ground for AI. For example, a significant milestone was achieved in
81997 when the IBM Deep Blue computer beat the world champion chess player Garry Kasparov [56]. In early 2011
IBM performed a live demonstration of a computer system, named Watson, designed to play the TV quiz show game
Jeopardy!. The novel aspect of Jeopardy! is that rather than a standard Q&A format, usually with multiple-choice
style answers, conversely the host presents somewhat cryptic answers, and the contestants must formulate the original
question that leads to that answer. Watson played against two of the best previous winners of Jeopardy! and, in the
third and final match, beat them both.
In 2016 a weak AI hit the headlines again, this time in the form of AlphaGo from Google DeepMind, a computer
program [57] designed to play the ancient Chinese game of Go, a game that was previously thought to be, within
the foreseeable future, essentially unplayable by a computer. To the amazement of many, AlphaGo beat 9th dan
professional player Lee Sedol by four games to one in a competition consisting of five matches. More recently Ke Jie,
considered the world’s best player, was also beaten by AlphaGo, which won all three games [58]. The AlphaGo team
have since dispensed with supervised learning, i.e. learning with some form of input from humans, and moved on to
pure reinforcement learning. The latest iteration of the program, AlphaGo Zero [59] was capable, within three days
of being turned on, to become good enough to beat the version that played Lee Sedol by 100 games to 0. Note that
despite this amazing feat, AlphaGo Zero is a still weak AI; as it stands it would be completely incapable of playing
chess without being reprogrammed by a human.
The Technological Singularity
It was the polish mathematician Stanis law Ulam, in 1958 in his tribute to John von Neumann who mentions [60]
“the ever accelerating progress of technology and changes in the mode of human life, which gives the appearance of
approaching some essential singularity in the history of the race beyond which human affairs, as we know them, could
not continue.”. In 1966 Irving John Good [61] described the following scenario: “Let an ultraintelligent machine be
defined as a machine that can far surpass all the intellectual activities of any man however clever. Since the design of
machines is one of these intellectual activities, an ultraintelligent machine could design even better machines; there
would then unquestionably be an “intelligence explosion,” and the intelligence of man would be left far behind. Thus
the first ultraintelligent machine is the last invention that man need ever make...”.,
That said, perhaps the best argument against there ever being produced such an ultraintelligent machine in the
first place was put forward by Bertram Bowden: “there is no point in building a machine with the intelligence of a
man, since it is easier to construct human brains by the usual method.”.
Five examples of machine learning being used in science today
Deep learning: CERN
One of the ‘early adopters’ of the application of machine learning in scientific discovery was the high energy physics
community [62], notably at the Conseil Europe´en pour la Recherche Nucle´aire (CERN) where deep learning [63] is
being used [64] to filter through the enormous data sets that are continuously being generated (up to 25 gigabytes per
second! [65]) For example, looking for rare exotic particles amongst an enormous sea of particle collisions [66] such
as the the decay of the Higgs boson [67]. This can be viewed as a classification problem, well suited to deep learning.
Indeed, “...deep learning could even lead to the discovery of particles that no theorist has yet predicted” [68].
Automated experiments: quantum mechanics and MELVIN
There is perhaps no branch of the physical sciences that is more universally recognised as being counterintuitive
than quantum mechanics. It is a field that pushes our ability to reason, and thus our ability to understand, to the
very limits of human intellectual capacity. In a recent paper [69] a computer program called MELVIN has been used
to design configurations that, in the words of the authors “..experiments found by our algorithm show a departure
from conventional experiments in quantum mechanics in that they rely on highly unfamiliar, but perfectly conceivable
experimental techniques”. The algorithm starts with a ‘tool-box’ composed of commonly used optical components
readily available in the laboratory such as prisms, mirrors, beam splitters etc. It then assembles these components
randomly, and learns the output of this hypothetical laboratory setup. If the output is deemed to be ‘useful’, it is
memorised and can come to form one of the building blocks of a subsequent, more elaborate setup. In other words,
9the algorithm learns from experience. MELVIN, running for 150 hours (see [69] for details) designed 51 novel, yet
feasible experiments. Without learning, the algorithm, running for a period of 250 hours, was unable to discover a
number of the novelties found with learning.
Symbolic regression: EureqaR©
In 2009 Schmidt and Lipson created a computer program, now known as Eureqa R© [70] that was able to re-discover
important chunks of classical mechanics by itself. Directly quoting from the abstract in the Science paper: “Without
any prior knowledge about physics, kinematics, or geometry, the algorithm discovered Hamiltonians, Lagrangians, and
other laws of geometric and momentum conservation. The discovery rate accelerated as laws found for simpler systems
were used to bootstrap explanations for more complex systems, gradually uncovering the ‘alphabet’ used to describe
those systems” [71].
The Eureqa R© code uses symbolic regression, a technique that is used not only to obtain the parameters for an
equation from a data set (i.e. traditional regression analysis), but also the equation(s) themselves by way of an
evolutionary algorithm [53]. The evolutionary algorithm creates trial models by mixing and matching mathematical
‘genes’ (operators, functions etc) to form a ‘creatures’ (equations) well suited to its environment (the data set).
Artificial neural networks: molecular potentials
In the computer simulation of liquids one has the situation where, lets take as an example the molecule water,
there are at least one hundred and thirty thermodynamic models currently being studied in the literature [72] a
good number of which are built upon, or extensions of, the parameterised Lennard-Jones model in conjunction with
point charges. In the publication [73] instead neural network potentials, a technique originally designed for brain
research, were used as a set of ‘very flexible functions’, that were trained with the results of a range of condensed
phase configurations in order to ‘learn’ the ab-initio potential energy surface of water molecules. Such a model is not
pre-biased by any prior conceptions of what, in this case a water molecule, should ‘look-like’, no matter how valid
the physical reasoning behind the model is. This is not the only example, artificial neural network potentials have
also been successfully developed for Al3+ ions dissolved in water [74], aqueous NaOH solutions [75], silicon [76], gold
nanoparticles [77], as well a number of other systems [78, 79]. Jo¨rg Behler has written some very good tutorials as to
how to implement molecular potentials in the form of neural networks [80, 81].
Monte Carlo tree search: organic molecule synthesis
AI is being applied to the field of organic chemistry. Retrosynthetic analysis involves proposing a synthesis route by
working backwards to molecules that one knows how to make. The researchers trained their AI [82] with the Reaxys R©
database, which contains over 40 million chemical reactions, obtained from patents and publications spanning dating
back to 1771. Using a combination of Monte Carlo tree search in conjunction with a deep neural network, they tested
their program on 40 randomly selected molecules, finding a restrosynthesys route for 95% of time, beating the state
of the art Best-First Search, using hand-coded heuristics, which provided routes for only 22.5% of the molecules in
the allotted time.
Possible limitations of AI
It is most likely the case that to do science requires a strong AI, something that some people suggest may be
impossible to create in a computer. In Searle’s aforementioned paper [51] he puts forth an argument as to why strong
AI is not possible. Searl created the Chinese room scenario, which builds upon the famous Turing test [84]. Turing’s
game essentially involved convincing a human interrogator that he or she is asking questions of a real person and not
a computer program, adding that “...in order that tones of voice may not help the interrogator the answers should
be written, or better still, typewritten. The ideal arrangement is to have a teleprinter communicating between the two
rooms.” In the Chinese room gedankenexperiment, Searle supposes that:
• There is a computer locked in a room that, when fed information written in Chinese, responds satisfactorily via
a printout, again in Chinese, in the process easily passing the Turing test with its answers.
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FIG. 6. Examples of an AI being fooled into annotating unrecognisable images with extremely high confidence (Source: Ref.
[83]).
• The computer, being a computer, follows a deterministic algorithm
• Given time and patience, Dr. Searl could sit in the room instead of the computer, and also follow the algorithm
(provided for him in English), and also output satisfactory answers in Chinese
• Dr. Searl has absolutely no knowledge of Chinese whatsoever, and thus no understanding of either what the
input nor the output means
• Therefore, the computer also has no real understanding of what it is doing, and as such does not think and has
no mind of its own.
There have been numerous publications both for and against this argument4. With regards to ‘real understanding’
Richard Feynman once said about one of the best theories that physicists have developed to date, “... I think I
can safely say that nobody understands quantum mechanics.” [85]. We may not understand quantum mechanics, but
nobody can deny that we certainly spend an inordinate amount of time thinking about it! All said and done, as we
have seen with Comte, philosophical arguments can sometimes be overtaken by practical advances. If the Church-
Turing-Deutsch principle [7] does hold, then there should be no reason why a strong AI cannot built. Given that a
strong AI in principle can be (and therefore eventually will be) built, here we mention some of the current problems
in AI.
• The statistical approach of machine learning may not be enough in itself to derive the laws of physics and apply
them to novel situations. Symbolic learning, using logic, will probably need to form part of the AI’s make-up
in order to have the ability of relational reasoning [86, 87].
• AI’s are not infallible. For example, a task that deep neural networks have become particularly good at is
image recognition. Each year ImageNet Large-Scale Visual Recognition Challenge is held to test AI’s ability to
perform various test on a large database of images, and each year the results improve. In 2014, in the image
classification part of the challenge the best AI achieved a 6.66% error rate [88], rivalling human annotators.
However, it has been shown that deep neural nets can produce false positives from images (see Fig. 6) that are
meaningless to humans [83].
• It would be difficult to define a generalised ‘reward function’. One cannot simply say to an AI ‘do science’, it
needs to know when it is making progress. It some how needs to embody, or more precisely encode, the question
that lies at the heart of science: ‘Why?’
4 Google Scholar lists over 5,800 citations of the original paper
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• Neural networks, especially deep neural networks, have been accused of being black-boxes, providing wonderful
results, but they themselves are seemingly indecipherable, the so-called ‘interpretability problem’. However, that
may be changing, with theories such as the ‘information bottleneck’ method [89, 90], along with a multitude
of mechanisms for teasing out the features that the deep neural network has honed in on as being the salient
features of, say, an image [91, 92].
EPILOGUE
Artificial intelligence is ever increasingly finding its way into the scientists tool-box as a powerful technique to
aid discovery. Although there is much ongoing work to develop AIs that perform certain human tasks better than
humans can, the biggest rewards will almost certainly come form AIs performing unthought-of tasks in an unforeseen
manner. However, asking an AI to perform science per se is a long way off, with major advances required before
any AI can encapsulate aspects such as motivation and independent creativity, required to tackle such a monumental
task. That said, eventually we may find ourselves leaving all scientific research to the AI’s. The predicted ‘Fourth
Industrial Revolution’ [93] could also bring with it a revolution in the way we undertake science. When will this
‘digital superintelligence’ that can conduct unsupervised science be developed? According to the Maes-Garreau law
5, sometime in the next 20 years. Until then we will just have to learn to cooperate with each other [94].
...“Forty-two!” yelled Loonquawl. “Is that all you’ve got to show for seven and a half million years’ work?”
–“I checked it very thoroughly,” said the computer, “and that quite definitely is the answer. I think the
problem, to be quite honest with you, is that you’ve never actually known what the question is.”
Douglas Adams - The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy
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